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JUDGE NOT: IN DEFENSE OF MINORITY-
CULTURE ARBITRATION
E. GARY SPITKO*
Elsewhere, I have argued that cultural minorities1 might use arbitration to
escape from cultural biases of the majoritarian legal system.2 In his article,
The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate
Judicial Decision-Making,3 Professor Ron Krotoszynski warns that such
minority-culture arbitration will further undermine the legitimacy of the
federal and state court systems.4 Professor Krotoszynski fears that a “mass
exodus” strategy for avoiding cultural bias in the public courts will
sufficiently reduce the opportunities for inter-cultural interaction, such that
the potential for harms from misunderstanding and prejudice will be
exacerbated for those cultural minority members who have no choice but to
litigate in the public court systems.5 In Professor Krotoszynski’s view, this
“will only further cripple the ability of the public courts to earn the trust and
confidence of particular cultural subgroups within the community.”6 Thus,
Professor Krotoszynski fears a vicious cycle.
In this essay, I defend the merits of minority-culture arbitration. Minority-
culture arbitration not only has great utility as a needed safe harbor from
majoritarian bias, it also holds great promise as an instrument of systemic
change.
I do agree with Professor Krotoszynski that cultural minorities and their
allies must remain engaged in “efforts to promote the legitimacy of dispute
resolution within the general public courts.”7 But where Professor
Krotoszynski sees minority-culture arbitration as an impediment to such
reform of litigation in the public courts, I view it as a potential instrument of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law— Indianapolis. A.B., 1987,
Cornell University; J.D., 1991, Duke University.
1. I have defined a “cultural minority” member as “an individual whose core religious, political,
or social values and beliefs differ meaningfully and substantially from majoritarian norms.” See E.
Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator From Majoritarian
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 275 n.1 (1999).
2. See generally id. (positing that minority-culture litigants might overcome cultural bias in the
majoritarian legal system by arbitrating their dispute before an arbitration panel whose membership is
selected so that it is more likely to be sensitive to the minority-culture litigants’ values and beliefs).
3. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for
Legitimate Judicial Decision-Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993 (1999).
4. See id. at 1036.
5. See id. at 1037.
6. Id. at 1041.
7. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1087+Moohr.doc 03/22/00   9:28 AM
1066 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1065
such reform. I believe that minority-culture arbitration can serve as both a
laboratory for developing procedural and substantive reforms, free from the
limitations of the majoritarian mindset and will, and as a means to habituate
the majority to the realities of the lives of cultural minorities. Such
experimentation and habituation, in my view, will tend to make “process”8
reform in the majoritarian court systems more certain and more swift.
I. THE “NEW LEGAL PROCESS”: IF YOU REBUILD IT, THEY WILL COME
In The New Legal Process, Professor Krotoszynski argues for “the utility
of process as a means of legitimating judicial decision-making.”9 He notes
“that cultural minorities are often . . . skeptical about the basic fairness of
judicial decision making.”10 Professor Krotoszynski’s article is a call for
dialogue on the means that might overcome this unfortunate but very real
distrust.
Professor Krotoszynski helpfully proposes several “first steps toward
generating dialogue about process values” that will promote confidence in
the judicial process among women and racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual-
orientation minorities.11 These steps include achieving increased diversity
among those who create the procedural rules that operate in the public court
systems and among the judiciary who staff those court systems.12
I join Professor Krotoszynski’s call for inclusion, dialogue, and reform. I
urge that we add as our next step in generating this important dialogue that,
once cultural minorities have accepted the invitation to join in the dialogue,
we listen to what it is they have to say. It will not be sufficient to build
confidence in the public court systems that cultural minorities come to the
table and take their seats; they must be heard as well as seen, and their points
of view must be appreciated and fully considered. I fear that Professor
Krotoszynski’s project is doomed to failure if those in the majority too
quickly and easily dismiss the concerns about the public adjudicatory
processes raised by those who traditionally have been disadvantaged by those
processes.
I think it unfortunate, therefore, that Professor Krotoszynski downplays
8. I use the term “process” in this essay expansively, as Professor Krotoszynski defines the
term. He defines “process” and “process values” to mean “the aggregation of all elements of the
litigation process, including the judges, the parties, the procedural rules, and the substantive rules.” Id.
at 1010 n.68.
9. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1051.
10. Id. at 1002.
11. Id. at 1050.
12. See id. at 1050-51.
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minority concerns of judicial bias before the dialogue that he calls for has
even begun.13 Professor Krotoszynski opines that “[i]f the judicial system
were as biased and political as some in the [Critical Legal Studies]
movement suggest, the general public would surely give it a great deal more
day-to-day attention.”14 I do not share Professor Krotoszynski’s confidence
in this majoritarian check on judicial bias given that the very bias at issue is
one in favor of the general public. To meet Professor Krotoszynski on his
field of sports metaphors, the fact that the Roman citizenry adored the Circus
is not compelling evidence that the “process” at issue was fair to Christians.
Moreover, as the problem that the proposed “New Legal Process” seeks
to overcome is one of not only actual bias but also of perceived and of feared
potential bias, it is not nearly a complete answer to state that the extent of
actual bias is less than cultural minorities believe.15 It is important, therefore,
that we listen to the life experiences of those who raise fears of bias so that
we can understand the source of those fears and begin to address them.16
By way of illustration, consider how a gay defendant in a same-sex sexual
harassment lawsuit might perceive the litigation process. I have argued
elsewhere that under current sexual harassment law, “the trier of fact in a
same-sex sexual harassment lawsuit is likely to judge the alleged behavior of
a gay sexual harassment defendant more harshly than it would judge the
identical behavior in a context where the defendant was not of the same sex
as the plaintiff.”17 I also have urged that, to lessen the likelihood of this
potential bias, the trier of fact in a same-sex sexual harassment lawsuit should
be instructed to “evaluate the actions of the gay same-sex sexual harassment
defendant in the hypothetical context of a mixed-sex interaction”18 and that it
must not find the gay defendant’s conduct actionable unless it also would
find actionable the identical behavior in a mixed-sex interaction.19
13. See Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-Discrimination
Law, 75 DENV. U.L. REV. 1321, 1325 (1998) (positing that an important component of constructing
feminist legal theories is “listening to and believing women’s stories” and “holding back the critiques
and the judgments until the story has been heard in full— with empathy and understanding”).
14. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1002.
15. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687,
1742 (1997) (positing that “[e]ven apart from whether [gay and lesbian] couples will face less bias in
gay and lesbian mediation, couples may feel more comfortable and reach better solutions merely
because they feel more comfortable”).
16. See generally Cain, supra note 13 (recounting stories of female to male transsexuals and
suggesting reforms of anti-discrimination laws in light of these stories).
17. E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the
“Reasonable Heterosexist” Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 56 (1997).
18. Id. at 95.
19. See id. at 96.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1087+Moohr.doc 03/22/00   9:28 AM
1068 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1065
One response to this proposed process reform of sexual harassment law
might be to downplay the need for any reform. One might argue that I have
overestimated the probability and extent of heterosexist reactions by triers of
fact to same-sex sexual interactions.20 Such a response alone, however,
seems unlikely to build the confidence in the public court systems that
Professor Krotoszynski seeks to establish among sexual-orientation
minorities.
Posit, for the sake of discussion, a gay man who has experienced social
difficulty in response to his public display of same-sex affection— for
example, holding hands with his boyfriend as the two men walk down a
public street.21 Such social difficulty might range from the awkward stares of
passers-by to a violent assault. Posit further that this gay man suspects that he
would not have suffered this social difficulty had he been walking down the
street holding the hand of a woman. Finally, assume that some time after he
has experienced this social difficulty, this gay man finds himself the accused
harasser in a same-sex sexual harassment lawsuit arising from his alleged
interactions with a male subordinate.
It seems to me likely that the gay man’s personal life experiences with
cultural bias will cause him to fear a heterosexist bias in the public court
system in the context of a same-sex sexual harassment lawsuit. In the
absence of some compelling evidence that the presumably heterosexual trier
of fact will evaluate the gay man’s alleged interactions with his male
subordinate in a neutral fashion— that is to say, that the trier of fact will not
sanction any same-sex interaction that it would not also sanction in a mixed-
sex context— the gay alleged harasser is likely to wish that he had an
alternative to adjudication of his case in the public court system. Moreover, I
think it reasonable to hypothesize that the gay alleged harasser would be little
comforted by assurances that gay people have overestimated the extent and
probability of heterosexist reactions to same-sex interactions, or that if the
public courts were really as biased against gay people as the gay alleged
harasser believed, “the general public would surely give it a great deal more
day-to-day attention.”22
20. See Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims after Oncale: Defining the
Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 719-21, 726-33 (1998) (dismissing as
“speculative” my hypothesis that judges and juries will tend to treat acts of alleged same-sex sexual
harassment more harshly than they will tend to treat similar acts of alleged mixed-sex sexual
harassment).
21. See DAN SAVAGE, THE KID: WHAT HAPPENED AFTER MY BOYFRIEND AND I DECIDED TO
GET PREGNANT 36 (1999) (describing how same-sex couples are almost never free to hold hands
“unself-concious[ly]”).
22. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1002.
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In fact, some gay men and lesbians who find themselves accused of same-
sex sexual harassment might have an alternative to adjudication in a public
court system that has failed to adopt even the modest proposed reform that
would allow the trier of fact to “find a lesbian kiss, a gay caress, or a
homosexual expression of attraction to be actionable under Title VII only if
their mixed-sex counterparts also would ‘create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment.’”23 Arbitration might offer the gay alleged
harasser an opportunity to opt out of a legal forum that potentially is
culturally biased against him.
For example, the sexual harassment litigation might be within the scope
of an arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the employer-defendant
that calls for resolution of the claim before a tripartite arbitration panel.
Under such a tripartite arbitration scheme, the plaintiff and the defendant
both enjoy the right to select one of the three arbitrators who, together as a
panel, will hear and decide the case. The two-party selected arbitrators then
jointly select the third arbitrator.
Such a scheme allows the same-sex sexual harassment defendant to select
an arbitrator who is familiar with and accepting of gay sexuality. At a
minimum, this selection and the defendant-appointed arbitrator’s input into
the selection of the third arbitrator lessen the likelihood that the outcome of
the sexual harassment litigation will be influenced by hostility to gay
sexuality. More generally, the tripartite scheme seems structurally well-suited
to bridging gaps between cultures. Litigants have the opportunity to appoint
decision makers from different cultures who will work together to arrive at a
decision that reflects an informed social understanding. Absent meaningful
process reforms in the public court systems that address minority-culture
litigants’ concerns of real, potential, and perceived biases in those courts,
public adjudication will be unable to compete with private adjudication as a
forum that is sought out for its potential for socially informed decision-
making.
II. LITIGATION AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM SOCIAL
UNDERSTANDINGS
In a very different context, Professor Stephen Ware has written of the
potential that arbitration holds for producing “better” law for commercial
disputants who fear that the triers of fact in the public courts might not fully
appreciate the nuances of their dispute.24 He points out that arbitration
23. Spitko, supra note 17, at 96 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
24. See generally Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Washington University Open Scholarship
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affords the opportunity for creation of “sophisticated, comprehensive legal
system[s]” tailored to specific industries.25 He further argues that the private
competitive market for law that arbitration can bring might result in the
creation of legal norms superior to those produced under a government
monopoly over lawmaking. This would be so precisely for the same reasons
that competition in other commercial contexts results in better services (from
the point of view of the consumer) than does monopolization.26
Professor Krotoszynski has reacted with caution to the emerging dialogue
on private adjudication’s potential for overcoming majoritarian ignorance
and biases in the public court systems. He questions whether the immediate
gratification that minority-culture litigants might reap from exiting the
majoritarian court systems today might not compound the problems of those
minority-culture litigants who are forced into the majoritarian court systems
tomorrow.27 Given our “pluralistic society in which members of myriad
ethnic, religious, racial, and ideological groups must, of necessity, interact on
a daily basis,” Professor Krotoszynski harbors “grave doubts about the
wisdom of balkanizing the adjudication of basic legal rights in private courts
defined by a common membership in a particular cultural group.”28 He
concludes that “[s]uch an approach would tend to exacerbate, rather than
reduce, the legitimacy problems that the federal and state courts currently
face.”29
Specifically, Professor Krotoszynski fears that, to the extent that cultural
minorities routinely choose to exit the majority court systems in favor of
minority-community-based arbitration, the majority community will lose
valuable opportunities to interact with cultural minorities, and “the potential
for misunderstanding and prejudice would be increased.”30 Professor
Krotoszynski further argues that this increased misunderstanding and
prejudice itself will then further reduce the legitimacy of the public court
systems in the views of cultural minorities.31 For these reasons, Professor
Krotoszynski concludes that “[r]ather than attempting to flee the court
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
25. Id. at 746-47.
26. See id. at 747.
27. See Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1036-37, 1041.
28. Id. at 1036.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1037. Cf. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,
99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986) (expressing the concern that “by diverting particular types of cases
away from adjudication, we may stifle the development of law in certain disfavored areas of law”).
31. See Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1036-37. Cf. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of
the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2625-26 (1995) (arguing that arbitration undermines the
authority of courts as “an authoritative resolver of controversies”).
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system, cultural minorities should attempt to secure meaningful reforms that
lead to a higher degree of confidence in the basic fairness and reliability of
these institutions.”32 Moreover, Professor Krotoszynski challenges those of
us who advocate the “‘right of exit’ from the public courts” to consider “the
adverse consequences that the larger community might suffer as a result of a
generalized” exodus.33
Professor Krotoszynski’s challenge is useful and timely. In evaluating the
merits of private adjudication of minority-culture concerns, one should
consider the potential of public adjudication to inform social understandings.
That potential is enormous.
Professor Jane Schacter has written most eloquently of public
adjudication’s power “to shape social knowledge and ideas.”34 She illustrates
the point with the case of In re Adoption of Evan,35 in which the court
approved the petition of a lesbian couple to jointly adopt a six-year old boy
who the couple had raised together since his birth. The court’s opinion,
which was among the first in the nation to approve such a lesbian co-parent
adoption,36 spoke of how truly blessed the boy was to have “two adults
dedicated to his welfare, secure in their loving partnership, and determined to
raise him to the very best of their considerable abilities.”37 The court
concluded that “[t]here is no reason in law, logic or social philosophy to
obstruct such a favorable situation.”38
Professor Schacter relates how the mainstream press and the gay press
widely disseminated the Adoption of Evan court’s opinion, sending an
“affirming representation of this lesbian family into the larger public
processes in which social meanings are made.”39 Professor Schacter
concludes that in this way, public adjudication “can mediate rather than
simply mirror the image of a lesbian family because that image can be
changed and enhanced by the authoritative recognition and respect of the
law.”40
In short, public adjudication holds enormous potential for advancing
32. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1036.
33. Id. at 1046.
34. Jane S. Schacter, “Counted Among the Blessed”: One Court and the Constitution of Family,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1996).
35. 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1992).
36. See Schacter, supra note 34, at 1267.
37. 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
38. Id.
39. Schacter, supra note 34, at 1269.
40. Id. Cf. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination
Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 437-39 (1999) (arguing that public resolution of employment
discrimination claims by the courts forms public values that govern future conduct).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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progressive agendas, both directly in equalizing cultural minorities under the
law, and indirectly, in humanizing cultural minorities beyond the
courtroom.41 For this reason, among others, I would not endorse “a policy of
disengagement and withdrawal”42 from the public court systems, even if such
a mass exodus were practical, which of course it is not.
Rather, cultural minorities and their allies must remain engaged in efforts
to remove cultural bias from the majoritarian legal system even as they seek
to develop alternatives to that system.43 The goal must be to make private
adjudication of claims affecting cultural minorities unnecessary as a means
for overcoming cultural bias. A left-handed litigant may well prefer private
adjudication as a means for reducing cost and delay, but she need not resort
to such private adjudication to overcome systemic bias in the public courts
against left-handed people. (Indeed, a complete absence of bias in the legal
system against left-handed people does much to explain the absence of a
“Law & Left-Handedness” movement within the legal academy.)
But until cultural differences are as irrelevant in the majoritarian legal
system as is left-handedness, resort by cultural minorities to private
adjudication of minority-culture concerns should be considered and
evaluated as to whether it might be instrumental in protecting the private
litigants from majoritarian bias, a safe-harbor function, and as to whether
such arbitration might retard systemic change or might itself serve as a means
for affecting systemic change. A helpful focus for debate is the question:
under what circumstances is minority-culture arbitration more helpful than
harmful, both with respect to the immediate litigants and with respect to the
larger society?44
41. See Schacter, supra note 34, at 1268. Of course, public adjudication has the power to
diminish as well as to enhance the social standing of cultural minorities. Compare Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (commenting that “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated”) with
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985), rev’d, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that
Georgia’s prohibition of sodomy “implicates a [gay man’s] fundamental right” of privacy and
commenting that, for such persons, such sexual intimacy “serves the same purpose as the intimacy of
marriage”). See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Equal Justice Under Law: The Jurisprudential
Legacy of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., 109 YALE L.J. (forthcoming April 2000) (noting that Judge
Johnson’s opinion in Hardwick v. Bowers teaches “a basic recognition of the equal dignity of all
persons”).
42. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1037, 1034-35 (misrepresenting my position as one “that the
only reliable means of securing the legal rights of cultural minorities is for them to resort to essentially
private, community-based systems of adjudication”).
43. On this broad point, Professor Krotoszynski and I would seem to be in agreement. Professor
Krotoszynski does not “categorically reject” minority-culture arbitration of disputes in absolute terms
provided “that such efforts must be in addition to, and not in lieu of, efforts to promote the legitimacy
of dispute resolution with the general public courts.” Id. at 1041.
44. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/3
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I believe that Professor Krotoszynski largely overstates the extent to
which arbitration of minority-culture concerns will retard systemic change.
He seems insensitive to the extent to which minority-culture arbitration may
be necessary and useful to the minority-culture litigant in avoiding systemic
bias. And he wholly overlooks the extent to which minority-culture
arbitration can be used instrumentally to affect positive systemic change.
This essay next takes each of these points in order.
III. ARBITRATION AS A (SOMETIMES HARMLESS) SAFE HARBOR PENDING
PROCESS REFORMS
Professor Krotoszynski compares my proposal for minority-culture
arbitration to “a plea for the re-creation of segregated sporting leagues on the
ground that racial prejudice precludes the fair treatment of minority athletes
in integrated contests.”45 He argues that “[j]ust as sports heroes like Jackie
Robinson, Hank Aaron, and Willie Mays helped average Americans confront
and overcome their irrational racial prejudices, so too the interaction of
various cultural groups in our courts of law helps to sensitize the community
to the fact of irrational prejudice against members of cultural minorities.”46
Professor Krotoszynski cautions, therefore, against “the potential loss of the
public adjudication of certain categories of legal claims involving particular
cultural minorities” that would flow from minority-culture arbitration.47
In evaluating this and other potential harms of minority-culture
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2663-65 (1995) (arguing that the academic
debate “for and against” settlement has at times been overly simplistic and adversarial and positing
that the more helpful “question is not ‘for or against’ settlement . . . but when, how, and under what
circumstances should cases be settled?”).
45. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1044-45. Implicit throughout Professor Krotoszynski’s
critique of my call for minority-culture arbitration is a rejection of the notion that “separate but equal”
treatment of cultural minorities under the law should ever be the preferred alternative. See id. at 1035-
37. Separate but equal treatment, however, need not imprint a stamp of inferiority on the cultural
minorities who are the subject of the discriminating law. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED
STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 64 (1997) (“The phrase ‘equal protection of the
laws’ can plausibly be read either to permit or to condemn the principle of separate but equal. The
difference in interpretation turns largely upon whether one regards the separation as natural or benign
or as unfairly presumptive of racial hierarchy and predictably subordinating.”).
Indeed, separate but equal treatment under the law in response to relevant fundamental differences
may be necessary to avoid sending a message that the minority group does not merit positive attention.
See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital
Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (arguing that the Uniform Probate Code’s failure to
distinguish between the intestate inheritance rights of gay people and non-gay people ignores a
fundamental distinction in the lives of gay people as contrasted with the lives of non-gay people and
sends a message that gay and lesbian relationships are insignificant or unsuitable for recognition).
46. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1045.
47. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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arbitration, it is important to distinguish, as Professor Krotoszynski fails to
do, among various types of litigation with varying potentials for informing
social understandings and, more generally, for impacting the public interest.48
Many categories of litigation, for example, are less comparable to watching
Jackie Robinson play baseball than they are to watching the grass grow at the
neighborhood softball field.49 The public interest in such claims is likely to
be minimal and adjudication of such claims in the public courts is likely to be
little noticed. There would seem to be little lost, therefore, in the way of
“general social benefits flowing from the exercise of facing and deciding the
questions embedded in the claim”50 by the removal of such claims from the
majoritarian court system.51 For the minority-culture litigant, however, there
might be much to be gained by such removal.
The typical probate dispute is illustrative of this point. Ordinarily, probate
proceedings are little noticed by those without an immediate interest in the
estate at issue.52 Moreover, modern probate law generally is statutorily
48. See Edwards, supra note 30, at 671-76 (suggesting that ADR mechanisms that are divorced
from the courts are “wholly inappropriate” for resolving litigation involving “significant public rights
and duties,” but may be appropriate for solely “private” disputes that do not implicate important public
values); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984) (pointing out that in
evaluating the effects of settlement on the judicial system and the quest for justice, one must appreciate
that “[a]ll cases are not equal”); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 44, at 2666 (arguing that an evaluation
of the merits of settlement versus adjudication should consider the multiple variables particular to each
dispute); Moohr, supra note 40, at 400-01 (concluding that arbitration is less effective than litigation at
promoting the goal of ending workplace discrimination but conceding that “arbitration is the only
viable forum for certain employees because it generally offers affordable and expeditious resolution of
claims”); id. at 457 (rejecting the view that no statutory claim should be arbitrable, and calling for a
“particularized inquiry to determine whether arbitration furthers the policy objective of the statute at
issue”).
49. See Edwards, supra note 30, at 680 (suggesting that “highly fact-bound” employment
discrimination cases that do not present novel questions of law may properly be resolved by an
arbitrator but employment discrimination cases that “present novel questions . . . should be resolved by
a court”). But see Moohr, supra note 40, at 455 n.304 (positing that “the development of
discrimination law [evidences that] discrimination cases depend upon the application of a developing,
rather than a fixed, law to a wide range of factual situations”).
50. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1045.
51. To the extent that the “general social benefits” of which Professor Krotoszynski writes
include the opportunity to educate the public trier of fact about minority-culture concerns, removal of
litigation to a private minority-culture forum indeed would result in a lost opportunity to provide the
public trier of fact with a transforming experience.
52. Occasionally, a probate dispute does capture wide public interest. A decedent’s fame or great
wealth generally is prerequisite to such interest. See, e.g., DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE:
THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993) (chronicling the litigation
concerning the estate of J. Seward Johnson); Mark Miller, Battling for a Billion: Anna Nicole Smith’s
Big Inheritance Showdown, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 41 (reporting on the fight over the late J.
Howard Marshall’s $1.6 billion fortune being waged between the decedent’s 31-year old widow, the
1993 Playboy Playmate of the year, and the decedent’s 60-year old son).
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defined in great detail and is largely well-settled.53 Most probate disputes,
therefore, would not seem to present an opportunity to “make new law” or
grab headlines in a way that will transform social understandings.54
Probate law is structured, however, so that some probate disputes can
serve as vehicles for the imposition of majoritarian cultural norms on the
decedent who has left an estate plan that deviates from the cultural norm
favoring dispositions to the legal spouse and close blood relations over
dispositions to “non-family.”55 The doctrines of testamentary capacity, undue
influence, and testamentary fraud are sufficiently nebulous that they give
wide berth to a trier of fact who is intent on disregarding the estate plan that
offends the majoritarian norm favoring family and close blood relations.56
Once the trier of fact has declared the testator’s estate plan invalid, the estate
might be subject to distribution in accordance with the jurisdiction’s intestacy
scheme57 that itself is likely to reflect the same majoritarian norm that prefers
the legal spouse and close blood relations over “non-family.”58
Process reform, as Professor Krotoszynski defines that term,59 could go a
long way toward alleviating the concerns of majoritarian bias of at least some
minority-culture testators. For example, reform of intestacy statutes to
provide a significant share of the decedent’s intestate estate to her same-sex
53. See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE Article II (1997) (providing the substantive law of
intestate succession as well as substantive rules covering the execution and revocation of wills and
certain other non-probate instruments).
54. One can cite counterexamples. See e.g., Evans v. May, 923 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. App.
1996) (declining to hold that the will beneficiary’s “30-year relationship as the decedent’s [same-sex]
‘lifemate’ constitute[d] undue influence as a matter of law”); In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993) (rejecting a surviving same-sex partner’s claim for a spouse’s elective share in the
decedent’s estate).
55. See generally Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235,
257-58 (1996) (reporting the results of Professor Leslie’s empirical study of will contests and
concluding that “regardless of what courts declare, the presumption in favor of family members
generally can be overcome only where the court views the testator’s reason for disinheriting relatives
as morally acceptable”).
56. See Spitko, supra note 1, at 278-85.
57. If the decedent executed an estate plan prior to her execution of the estate plan that has been
adjudicated invalid, the prior estate plan, rather than the intestacy scheme, might control the
disposition of the decedent’s estate under some circumstances. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 276 (6th ed. 2000) (“If a duly executed will is not revoked
in a manner permitted by statute, the will is admitted to probate”) (emphasis omitted).
58. See Spitko, supra note 1, at 280-81. Presently, California, Hawaii, and New Hampshire are
the only American jurisdictions that provide an intestate share to others than a legal spouse or blood or
adopted relations. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2000) (providing intestate inheritance
rights to certain step-children and foster children); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (Michie
Supp. 1998) (providing intestate inheritance rights to a decedent’s “reciprocal beneficiary” who can be
a decedent’s registered same-sex partner); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1992) (providing intestate
inheritance rights to certain mixed-sex non-marital cohabitants).
59. See supra note 8.
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partner60 or her functional but non-legal child61 would reduce, under certain
circumstances, the incentive, and perhaps the ability, of blood relations to
challenge the decedent’s estate plan in favor of such non-traditional
legatees.62 Such reform might also reduce the ability of the trier of fact to
reorder the estate plan in accordance with majoritarian norms.63
With such process reform, the minority-culture testator who favored in
her will her same-sex partner or non-legal child might have less cause to fear
majoritarian bias in the majoritarian legal system with respect to the probate
of her will and, thus, might have much less of an incentive to flee the
majoritarian court system in this instance.64 Absent such process reforms,
however, a minority-culture testator could gain some peace of mind through
a provision in her will mandating that any challenge to her will shall be
adjudicated by an arbitrator named by the testator in her will.65 Through
arbitration, the testator may increase the likelihood that the decision maker in
any will contest understands and respects the testator’s values and may
decrease the likelihood that the trier of fact will invalidate the will because of
an animus to the testator’s dispositive choices.66
Thus, arbitration can serve as a safe harbor from majoritarian bias until
process reform makes such a safe harbor unnecessary. Moreover, for many
classes of litigation, this safe harbor function can be achieved with very little
trade-off in lost social understanding resulting from the avoidance of the
60. See generally Spitko, supra note 45 (arguing that reform of Article II of the Uniform Probate
Code to provide intestate inheritance rights to surviving same-sex committed partners would be
consistent with the values upon which the drafters based Article II).
61. See generally Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW &
INEQ. J. (forthcoming Jan. 2000) (proposing that the definitions of parent and child in intestacy statutes
be expanded to include those persons who can establish a functional parent-child relationship).
62. To the extent that intestacy reform removes the blood relatives’ status as heirs, the blood
relatives would lack standing to bring such a challenge to the decedent’s estate plan unless the
decedent had previously denominated such persons as legatees. If a prior estate plan left more property
to the blood relations than the decedent’s final estate plan, the blood relations would have both
standing and the incentive to challenge the final estate plan regardless of the intestacy scheme.
63. Such intestacy reform might not impair the trier of fact’s ability to reorder the decedent’s
estate plan in accordance with majoritarian cultural norms in situations where the decedent had
executed an estate plan that conformed to such norms prior to her execution of her final estate plan.
64. Reform of other default rules relating to family relations to recognize the realities of gay and
lesbian lives also would likely do much to build the confidence that gay and lesbian people have in the
public court systems. See Thomas P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for
Same-Sex Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 1999) (arguing for reform of default rules in
the areas of intestacy, healthcare decision-making, and guardianship to recognize the realities of the
lives of gay and lesbian people).
65. For an analysis of whether such an arbitration clause should be enforceable, see Spitko, supra
note 1, at 297-314.
66. See id. at 294-97.
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majoritarian court systems.67
IV. ARBITRATION AS A LABORATORY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PROCESS REFORMS
In addition to its potential for serving as a safe harbor from a biased trier
of fact, arbitration holds great promise as a means for avoidance of biased
substantive law. As Professor Ware has written, “arbitration agreements
permit a menu [of substantive law] limited only by the parties’
imaginations.”68 Thus, cultural minorities might use arbitration to opt out of
substantive law that was developed without regard to their special
circumstances and to opt into substantive law custom made for them.
Moreover, in serving as a safe harbor for cultural minorities from biased
substantive law, arbitration simultaneously can serve as a vehicle for
facilitating diversity in substantive law to match the diversity in the general
population.
The precarious legal situation faced by many gay or lesbian co-parented
families provides a compelling example of the urgent need for such an ability
to opt out of substantive law drafted with majoritarian norms in mind and
without any regard for the special needs of cultural minorities. According to
some estimates, millions of children in the United States today live in
families headed by a gay or lesbian parent or parents.69 Many of these
children were born or adopted into a heterosexual marriage with a husband or
wife who later came out as gay.70 Indeed, prior to 1980, it was quite rare for a
67. Even for classes of litigation that do have the potential to transform social understandings,
arbitration may be the more useful approach in some circumstances. Arbitration of selected cases
would allow for the resolution of those particular disputes while preventing courts that are likely to be
hostile to the minority culture or the proposed legal reform at issue from acting on their bias or setting
a negative precedent on the relevant question. Thus, for example, those who attempt to manage the
movement for gay and lesbian legal equality might consider litigating novel issues of law in the courts
of more progressive states, while submitting to arbitration the very same issues when they arise in
jurisdictions that have proven hostile to gay and lesbian equality.
68. Ware, supra note 24, at 727.
69. See, e.g., Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family
Values by a “Simulacrum of Marriage,” 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1730 n.187 (1998) (citing
sources that estimate the number of gay or lesbian parents in the United States at between 1.5 million
and 5 million and sources that estimate the number of children in the United States being raised by a
gay or lesbian parent at between 1.5 million and 10 million); Joan Lowy, Movement to Halt Gay
Adoptions Gathers Steam; Homosexuals More Outspoken About Desire to Create Families,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at A8 (reporting that the National Adoption Information
Clearinghouse, a federal agency, estimates that between 2.5 million and 8 million gay parents are
raising between 6 million and 14 million children and reporting that the Family Pride Coalition, a
support group for gay and lesbian families, estimates that approximately 2 million gay parents are
raising between 3 million and 5 million children).
70. Caryle Murphy, Gay Parents Find More Acceptance, WASH. POST, June 14, 1999, at A1
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1087+Moohr.doc 03/22/00   9:28 AM
1078 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1065
gay man or lesbian to have a child outside of a heterosexual relationship.71
Since the early 1980s, however, the United States has experienced a “gay
baby boom.”72 Gay men and lesbians continue to have children within the
context of a heterosexual relationship such as a traditional marriage.73 In
ever-increasing numbers, however, gay men and lesbians have been having
and raising children who have never lived in a household headed by a
heterosexual couple or a non-gay person.74
Some of these children were born to or were adopted by a gay or lesbian
parent who alone chose to create a family with only one functional parent
who is also the sole legal parent.75 Many other children were brought into a
family, through birth or adoption, in which two gay or lesbian parents
planned to raise the child jointly as equal functional co-parents.76 Gay
couples may create such co-parented families through surrogacy or
adoption.77 Lesbian couples may create such co-parented families though
(reporting that, according to the executive director of the Family Pride Coalition, “the overwhelming
majority of about 2 million parents who are gay are raising children from earlier heterosexual
marriages”).
71. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Brief: The Social Construction of Parenthood in One Planned
Lesbian Family, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213, 219 & n.2 (1996) (documenting the first
appearance in the early 1980s of media reports, scholarly articles, and litigation concerning children
planned and raised in lesbian co-parented families).
72. See id. at 221-27 (documenting the increased prevalence of planned lesbian and gay families
since the early 1980s and the modern boom in media resources, conferences, support groups, and
media coverage targeted to or reporting on such families).
73. Upon dissolution of the heterosexual marriage, the gay or lesbian parent may find that his or
her minority sexual orientation or new same-sex relationship places him or her at a disadvantage in
any custody dispute with the non-gay parent in the majoritarian legal system. See e.g., Ex parte J.M.F.,
730 So. 2d 1190, 1195-96 (Ala. 1998) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in
changing custody of a divorced couple’s child from the mother to the father where the mother had
“established an open lesbian relationship, which [the mother and her partner] explained to the child
and which they demonstrate with affection in the presence of the child on a regular basis” and where
the father had “established a happy marriage with a woman”); Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904
(N.C. 1998) (holding that the evidence supported the trial court’s decision to change the custody of a
divorced couple’s two children from the father to the mother where the father “was regularly engaging
in sexual acts with [another man] in the home”).
74. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 70 (relating the stories of the creation of several such planned
gay and lesbian families through surrogacy and artificial insemination).
75. See Ronald Smothers, Accord Lets Gay Couples Adopt Jointly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997, at
B4 (reporting the comments of an adoption researcher with the Child Welfare League of America that
gay and lesbian single-parent adoptions have become more prevalent in recent years).
76. See, e.g., Adrienne Drell, Panel Rebukes Adoption Judge, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 2,
1999, at NWS8 (reporting that hundreds of adoptions by same-sex couples have been granted in
Illinois since 1995); Smothers, supra note 75 (describing the agreement between gay advocacy groups
and New Jersey child welfare officials that will let gay and lesbian couples in New Jersey adopt
children jointly, and reporting the comments of an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union’s
Lesbian and Gay Rights Project who represented more than 200 gay and lesbian couples in a class
action challenging New Jersey’s former policy opposing such adoptions).
77. See e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 21 (relating a gay couple’s experiences with the open adoption
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alternative insemination or adoption.78
As In re Adoption of Evan illustrates,79 the law in some jurisdictions has
evolved to recognize these new family structures. Indeed, the trend
subsequent to Adoption of Evan has been for courts to approve gay and
lesbian co-parent adoptions.80 Where, through a co-parent adoption, both gay
or lesbian co-parents have become recognized as the legal parents of the
child, both co-parents generally will retain parental rights with respect to
their child even if the co-parents terminate their partnership. Thus, both co-
parents can invest in their relationship with the child and with the family unit
secure in the knowledge that their parent-child relationships will not be
subject to unilateral termination by the other parent.
Gay or lesbian co-parent adoptions are not an option, however, in many
jurisdictions.81 The law in many states simply does not allow for a child to
have two legal mothers or two legal fathers. This legal non-recognition
endures despite the fact that such dual motherhood or dual fatherhood is a
reality for many children.
In such states, the termination of the gay or lesbian partnership would find
the co-parents on unequal legal ground with respect to rights relating to their
child.82 The biological or adoptive parent— that is, the sole legal parent—
process); Ted Gideonse, Baby by Proxy: Growing Generations Helps Gay Couples Through the Maze
of Surrogate Pregnancy, THE ADVOCATE, June 22, 1999, at 83 (discussing “Growing Generations,” a
company that assists gay individuals and couples with the surrogacy process); Susan Swartz, Santa
Rosa Woman Carrying Baby for Gay Couple, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), June 28, 1998, at
B1 (reporting on the surrogacy process from the perspective of a woman who chose to be a surrogate
for a gay couple).
78. See e.g., Daniela Altimari and Matthew Daly, Same-Sex Family Adoption Derailed:
Homosexual Marriage Ban Stalls Legislation, HARTFORD COURANT, June 4, 1999, at A6 (relating the
story of two lesbians who have been together as a couple for 25 years, one of whom recently adopted
two girls from Vietnam; under Connecticut law, the couple was not able legally to adopt the girls
jointly); Drell, supra note 76 (reporting on the cases of three lesbian couples in which one partner
conceived a child through artificial insemination and the other partner sought to become the second
mother through adoption).
79. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
80. See In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); Adoption of Two Children by
H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995);
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). See also Adoption of Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70 (Mass.
1997) (trial judge may not order a home study simply because the adoption petitioners are of the same
sex).
81. See In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999) (holding that Connecticut’s
adoption statute does not allow a biological mother’s lesbian partner to adopt the mother’s child unless
the biological mother first relinquishes her legal rights); In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d
678 (Wis. 1994) (holding that a lesbian co-parent cannot adopt her partner’s child unless the parental
rights of her partner are first terminated).
82. See John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 351-52 (1998) (reviewing case law and noting that “[m]ore often than
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would be in a superior position relative to her co-parent to gain custody of
their child. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the functional but non-legal parent
would find herself without standing to seek custody or even visitation rights
in relation to the child she has co-parented since the child’s birth.83 Even if
the jurisdiction allows the non-legal parent to petition for custody or
visitation, that parent may be at the same legal disadvantage as a third party
challenging a legal parent for custody.84
A system in which primary custody and visitation rights derive solely
from a biological relationship to the child or marriage to the mother of the
child might work well for the majority of non-gay people. But such rules are
presumptively dysfunctional for gay and lesbian families whose co-parents
are denied the privilege of legal marriage and for whom co-biological
parentage of the child is a physical impossibility.85 Indeed, if one were to set
out to design rules to promote the destruction of gay and lesbian families
upon fracture, one could hardly seek to do better than to adopt the present
rules basing primary custody and visitation rights on biology or marriage.
For this reason, I agree with Professor Krotoszynski’s broad thesis that
not, natural parents successfully resist assertions of child visitation rights by legal strangers such as
stepparents and so-called lesbian ‘co-parents’”).
83. See Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting a lesbian
former partner’s attempt to gain visitation rights through a guardianship proceeding and under a “de
facto parent” theory); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
mother’s lesbian former partner and co-parent, who had previously supported both the child and the
mother, lacked standing to petition for visitation or custody of the child who was conceived during the
relationship by artificial insemination); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (denying a biological mother’s lesbian former partner custody or visitation rights with respect to
the child they had jointly raised since the child’s birth on the grounds that the non-biological mother
lacked standing to petition for such rights). But see E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999)
(holding that a trial court possesses equity jurisdiction to grant visitation between a child and a lesbian
former partner of the child’s legal mother where the former partner was the child’s “de facto” parent);
Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (holding that a court may exercise its equitable
powers to grant visitation to a lesbian former partner who enjoys a parent-like relationship with the
child, even where the visitation statute does not provide for such a right).
84. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that legal mother’s
lesbian former life partner has standing to petition for partial custody of the child born during their
relationship but faces an “increased burden of proof required of third parties seeking custody rights”).
85. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who Is A Parent?: The Need to Develop A Lesbian Conscious
Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513, 515-17 (1993) (“Any rule of law that presumes
marriage to be a determining factor for legal recognition as a parent inherently discriminates against
lesbian families for the simple reason that lesbian couples are not allowed to marry. Rules that
presume that the biological connection between parent and child outweighs all other claims to
parenting likewise eliminate the possibility that the relationship between a non-biological lesbian
mother and the child she is raising with her partner will ever be recognized.”). See also Nancy D.
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children
in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 463 (1990) (pointing out that
upon the dissolution of a lesbian co-parenting couple, the “family will find itself in a court system ill-
prepared to recognize its existence and to formulate rules to resolve its disputes”).
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encourages advocates for gay and lesbian families to continue to litigate in
the public courts where appropriate and to petition state legislatures for
“process” reforms that recognize the realities of the lives of gay and lesbian
families.86 “Process” reforms such as those providing for gay and lesbian co-
parent adoptions not only better serve gay and lesbian families, but also have
great potential for legitimating the public court systems in the eyes of gay
men and lesbians.
For gay and lesbian couples who live in jurisdictions that have not yet
adopted such reforms, however, reform may come too late. Such reforms
already are too late for gay and lesbian couples that presently are co-
parenting or wish to co-parent in an environment in which neither parent is
forced to serve as a parent-at-will. Process reforms that come tomorrow will
not allow these couples to structure their lives today in a way that promotes
their family goals.
Arbitration, however, offers gay and lesbian co-parents the potential to
develop and adopt today their own law of child custody and visitation apart
from the heterosexual experiences and assumptions that dominate the
majoritarian legal dialogue. Pursuant to a pre-dissolution arbitration
agreement, a gay or lesbian couple can agree to be bound, in the event that
their partnership dissolves, by gay- and lesbian-friendly rules of standing and
custody decision-making. For example, a same-sex couple might agree to a
rule of standing for child custody and visitation claims along the lines of
Professor Nancy Polikoff’s proposal for expanding the definition of
parenthood.87 They might also reject the “best interests of the child” standard
as hopelessly heterosexist88 and instead agree to a substantive rule for child
custody and visitation decision-making along the lines of, for example,
Professor Elizabeth Scott’s “approximation” principle.89 Indeed, the co-
86. See Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1041-42. See also Ettelbrick, supra note 85, at 514-15
(urging that the law “be developed according to the perspectives and experiences of lesbians, in much
the same way that some advocate that it be developed to fit the experiences of women and people of
color”).
87. See Polikoff, supra note 85, at 464 (proposing “expanding the definition of parenthood to
include anyone who maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a legally
recognized parent created that relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental in nature”).
88. Academic criticisms of the prevailing “best interests” standard are legion. See Mary Becker,
Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 175 (1992)
(detailing biases in the application of the “best interests” standard against, for example, gay and
lesbian people and sexually active women); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child
Custody and the UMDA’s Best Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2219-25 (1991)
(summarizing criticisms of the “best interests” standard).
89. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV.
615, 630 (1992) (proposing that courts use past parental roles to guide their custody decisions “and
seek[] to approximate as closely as possible the predivorce patterns of parental responsibility in the
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parents could even attempt to persuade Professors Polikoff and Scott to serve
as the arbitrators who would implement their custody and visitation
principles.
In this way, arbitration can allow cultural minorities to structure their
lives under rules that were crafted with the realities of their lives in mind. By
replacing child custody and visitation rules that depend upon heterosexual
marriage or biology with rules that depend upon the functional parenting
roles that gay and lesbian co-parents fill, gay and lesbian co-parents can build
stronger families. The co-parents of an intact co-parenting relationship can
invest in their family relationships secure in the knowledge that the law will
respect their emotional investment.90
More generally, those minority-culture litigants who choose arbitration in
an attempt to circumvent law that they find dysfunctional for their particular
circumstances inadvertently might also further law reform by providing a
model for comparison. The private standards developed in arbitration might
expose how the laws that the majority has crafted for the general population
fail to serve the needs of cultural minorities.91 Therefore, the substantive law
that cultural minorities develop and implement in private arbitration to fit
their peculiar needs also can serve as the focus of reform efforts in the public
custody arrangement”).
90. Such an arbitration agreement governing child custody and visitation matters is useful in
structuring the lives of the co-parenting couple only if the couple can count on the public courts to
specifically enforce such an agreement and to defer in most cases to a resulting arbitration award. The
majority approach, however, is that an arbitration award relating to child custody or visitation is not
binding on the court because of the state’s parens patrie responsibilities with respect to the minor
child. See e.g., Masters v. Masters, 513 A.2d 104, 111-12 (Conn. 1986); Spencer v. Spencer, 494 A.2d
1279, 1285 (D.C. 1985); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Miller v.
Miller, 620 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 1993). See also Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends
in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 930 (1996) (noting that “most state courts hold that, while
divorcing parents may arbitrate disputes involving the custody, care, and costs of their children, the
arbitrator’s decision is subject to the court’s de novo review if the decision is not in the child’s best
interests”). But see Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185, 190-91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing for the use
of binding arbitration in resolving child custody disputes); Faherty v. Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257, 1263
(N.J. 1984) (in dicta, stating that an arbitrator may be as capable of protecting a child’s best interests as
is a judge). I believe that in deciding whether the state should enforce pre-dissolution arbitration
agreements that purport to govern custody and visitation rights relating to a minor child, courts should
be guided by the principles that govern state intervention in the parent-child relationship. For an
analysis concluding that these principles support enforcement of such arbitration agreements and
deference to resulting arbitration awards absent a showing of a likelihood of harm to the child, see E.
Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the “Creatures of the State”: Contracting for Child Custody Decision-
Making in the Best Interests of the Family” (Nov. 1, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
91. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 44, at 2676 (positing that a system of settlement of disputes
“serves to criticize, avoid, or correct laws that some find unjust, inefficient, or just plain
inapplicable”).
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court systems.92
Thus, arbitration holds great promise for enriching and focusing the
dialogue on reform that Professor Krotoszynski has called for. Those who
seek to formulate process reforms that will tend to increase the confidence of
cultural minorities in the public courts could look to the procedural and
substantive rules that cultural minorities have developed for themselves for
use in arbitration in response to their frustration with the “process” available
in the general public courts.
V. THE HABITUATING FUNCTION OF ARBITRATION
I have attempted to demonstrate how arbitration can serve as a necessary
safe harbor from procedural and substantive cultural bias in the general
public courts. I also have attempted to demonstrate how arbitration can serve
as a laboratory for process reforms as cultural minorities attempt to craft
rules that better govern their lives than do the purportedly “one size fits all”
rules that the majority has crafted. In so allowing cultural minorities to
structure their lives and legal disputes in ways that reflect their particular
needs, minority-culture arbitration also has great potential for habituating the
general public to the realities of the lives of cultural minorities and to the
notion that custom-made responses to these realities are both possible and
appropriate. These two habituations would be likely to lead to easier
acceptance of necessary process reforms that would better serve cultural
minorities in the public courts.
Each time cultural minorities use arbitration to contract around a hostile
or dysfunctional rule of general application and to replace this rule with a
better-serving custom-made rule, they have an opportunity to demonstrate to
the general public that the process shortcomings that drove the cultural
minorities from the general public courts are not intractable. They also have
the opportunity to demonstrate to the general public the utility of custom-
made solutions to minority-culture concerns and that these solutions to
process shortcomings can be implemented with little cost to the general
public. If minority-culture arbitration were to become routine, it is possible
that the general public would habituate to the idea that process-customization
is both practical and useful. Such habituation would lessen resistance to
adoption of process reforms tailored to cultural minorities.93
92. See id. (concluding that “[t]hrough individually adaptive solutions in settlement we may see
the limits of law and explore avenues for law reform”).
93. See Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But
Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107, 1140 (1996) (theorizing that the execution and
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1087+Moohr.doc 03/22/00   9:28 AM
1084 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1065
For example, when gay or lesbian co-parents arbitrate their custody
dispute using substantive rules for custody decision-making that do not
disadvantage the functional but non-legal co-parent relative to the legal
parent, they help to break down the belief that parental rights should in all
cases derive from marriage or biology. They help to habituate the general
public to the idea that the law can accommodate the reality that some
children do have two mothers or fathers. And they cause the public to
consider the costs of the prevailing law that denies this reality.
Arbitration also can facilitate habituation in a larger social context. This
second tier of habituation arises from the consequence that arbitration allows
the minority culture to survive and even to flourish. Biased procedural and
substantive law undermines the minority culture at the same time that it
disadvantages the minority-culture litigant. Arbitration allows cultural
minorities to protect themselves from these majoritarian procedural and
substantive biases that deny the validity of their values and relationships and
consequently undermine those values and relationships.
The end product of this protective maneuver is a larger public space for
the minority culture. As the minority culture flourishes, the general public
more frequently comes into contact with that culture and habituates to its
realties.94 Again, this habituation is likely to pave the way for process
reforms in the majoritarian legal system.
Consider one last time our lesbian co-parenting couple. Upon dissolution
of their partnership, the law in some jurisdictions would deny the non-legal
parent standing to petition for custody and visitation rights relating to the
child she has co-parented since birth with her former partner.95 A
consequence of such a restrictive rule of standing is that the child no longer
would have two mothers. The lesbian family would be not only fractured but
also legally extinct.
If the co-parents had been parties to a binding pre-dissolution arbitration
agreement that granted standing and substantive equality to the non-legal co-
parent, however, the lesbian family would be likely to survive, fractured but
enforcement of gay cohabitation contracts might habituate the general public to the notion of gay
couplehood and that this habituation might lead to the recognition of gay marriage as a public right).
94. See E.J. Graff, Equal Rights: When Heather’s Mommies Share Custody, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 12, 1999, at Focus (reporting the comment of the executive director of the National Center for
Lesbian Rights that “[a]s more [gay men and lesbians] become parents, [gay men and lesbians] are
showing up in places [they] have never been seen before: school board meetings, parent-teacher
conferences, Little League games, the soccer field, [and] school potluck fund raisers” and arguing that
the resulting familiarity of the non-gay majority with gay and lesbian parents will translate into greater
acceptance of gay and lesbian parenting).
95. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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extant. Regardless of which co-parent was awarded primary custody of their
child, both parents would have the legal right to continue to play an
important active role in the child’s life. This fractured but extant lesbian
family would remain in public view, offering an ongoing opportunity for the
general public to habituate to the reality that gay and lesbian people do form
such families.
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